



1. The most important and difficult subject connected with testamentary capa-
city.
2. The mind begins to decay very soon after its full maturity.
8 Loss of memory, one of the earliest symptoms of mental decay, very unequal.
4. Correct opinions upon this subject require familiarity with the particular case.
5 and n. 8. Dr. Taylor's test. Reasons why witnesses should be watchful not to
be deceived.
6. Old age should excite our watchfulness, but is not presumptive of want-of
capacity.
7 Extreme old age does not incapacitate where the act is rational and free.
8. Surrrogate BaADFoBD's rule in regard to wills executed by persons in extreme
old age.
9. Defect of memory, unless upon essential matters affecting the act, does not
incapacitate.
10. Chancellor KENT says, The will of an aged man ought to be regarded with great
tenderness.
n. 10. Judge BRADrORI'S reflections and statistics upon old age,
11. The commentary of Dr. Ray upon enile dementia.
12. His strictures upon the practice of courts in leaving too much to juries.
18. The rule of Mr. Justice WASHINGTOx quoted with'approbation.
14. Experts do not remove all doubts in a case, more than other witnesses.
15 and n. 16. Where imbecility of mind and injustice concur in a will, it gene.
rally fails.
16. Great watchfulness against imposition in such cases, proper.
1 From a Treatise on Wills. by Hon. Isaac F. Redfield, about to be published.
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SENILE DEMENTIA.
1. There is probably no form of mental unsoundness which
has to be considered so often, in connection with testamen-
tary cases, or which has so important a bearing upon, or the
thorough comprehension of which is so much to be desired, as
an aid toward the correct understanding of such cases as that
of the imbecility of old age, or senile dementia. There is no-
thing which more strikingly illustrates the incomprehensible nature
of the connection and true relations between the mind and the
body, the spirit and the flesh, than the wonderful inequality in
which different persons suffer abatement of the full vigor of their
youthful and mature mind, at the approach of advanced life.
While some persons suffer no apparent diminution of mental
power, even to advanced old age, and after great loss of physical
energy, and in some cases the occurrence of extreme feebleness,
others become decidedly imbecile in mind long before they cease
to have full strength and ability to perform the most difficult and
laborious offices of their usual occupations, except as they become
embarrassed therein by the loss of mental capacity."
2. It is not our purpose to attempt any analysis of these sur-
prising phenomena. In the majority of cases, probably the mind
begins to lose something of its elasticity and activity very soon
after the period of its full maturity. This is confessedly so in
regard to our physical powers. There is more uncertaiity in the
estimate of the powers of the mind, since the increase of expe-
rience and knowledge, which time produces at all stages of ad-
vancing life, in a measure compensates for the decline of the
mental faculties and powers.
1 Ray, Med. Jur., 1 336, ed. 1860. This experienced writer says: "The great
point to be determined is, not whether he was apt to forget the names of people
in whom he felt no particular interest, nor the dates of events which concerned
him little, but whether, in conversation about his affairs, his friends and relatives,
he evinced sufficient knowledge of both to be able to dispose of the former with
a sound and untrammelled judgment. It is a fact, that many of those old men
who appear so stupid, and who astonish the stranger by the singularity of their
conduct, need only to have their attention fairly fixed on their property, their
business, or their family, to understand them perfectly well, and to display their
iagacity in the remarks they make."
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3. The loss of memory is one of the earliest and surest indi-
cations of the approach of mental infirmity. This approaches
with very unequal steps in different persons. While in some it
is scarcely perceptible, even at fourscore, in others it becomes a
marked and serious infirmity, long before they reach the ordinary
period of human life.
4. Casual observers, those but slightly acquainted with the
person, are liable to very great misapprehension in regard to the
mental capacity of aged persons. To a correct estimate upon
this subject, it seems to be requisite that one should possess not
only general skill and experience upon the question,-but that he
should either have had long and familiar acquaintance with the
particular person, or'at least an ample opportunity to observe ihe
precise state of the mental powers, or that he should learn these
facts accurately from others.
5. The rule for testing the mental capacity of a person to do
an act requiring mental comprehension and disposing judgment,
given by Dr. Taylor,' is as reliable as any one, perhaps. "If. a
medical man be present when the will is made," says this learned
writer, "he may easily satisfy himself of the state of mind of
the testator, by requiring him to repeat from memory the mode
in which he has disposed of the bulk of his property. Meaical
men have sometimes piaced themselves in a serious position by
becoming witnesses to wills under these circumstances, without
first assuring themselves of the actual mental' condition-of the
testator. It would always be a good ground of justification, if,
dt the request of the witness, the testator had been made to re-
peat substantially the leading provisions of his will from memory.
If a dying or sick person [or any other one] cannot do this with-
out prompting or suggestion, there is reason to believe that he
has not a sane and disposing mind."'
I Med. Jur. 658, ed. 1861. See also Hatcorn vs. K'ing, 8 Mass. 871, where it
was held, that being able to recall the particulars of the directions given the
scrivener is evidence of testamentary capacity: .Harks vs. .Bryant, 4 Hen. & Munf&
91.
s We apprehend that what is here said in regard to the compromise of profes-
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6. Extreme old age raises some doubt of capacity, but only so
far as to excite the vigilance of the court. (Kinleside vs. ifarri-
eon, 2 Phillim. 449.) But no just inference could be made upon
sional character, by becoming the witness to a will, where the testator is not in a
proper condition to execute it, will be somewhat unintelligible to the American
mind. The impression in England is, both in the legal and medical profession,
that one is bound to give directions, on such occasions, in regard to what the
testator is competent to do, and that the medical attendant is responsible that
he do not countenance the act of attempting to execute a will after the patient is
incompetent to comprehend its import. That by consenting to become a witness
of the act he virtually certifies that the testator is of sound disposing mind and
memory. That if such proves not to have been the fact, the character of the medi-
cal witness is seriously compromised, inasmuch as he is subjected to one or other
of the alternatives resulting from the dilemma in which he is thus placed, either
that he was incompetent to detect .such incapacity, or else that, knowing of its
existence, he voluntarily connived at the creation of an instrument of great im-
portance and solemnity, while the supposed actor was in a state of mental
unsoundness which incapacitated him for its valid execution. Under such circum--
tances, the connivance may, with some show of reason, be regarded as impli-
cating the medical witness in a virtual fraud upon the legal disposition of the
property which would otherwise follow, since the attempt to execute a will at
such a time is getting up the shadow of a legal instrument, the effect of which
will be, if successfully carried through, to defeat legal rights which have already
practically taken effect and become vested, when the simulated agent no longer
possesses the capacity for voluntary action. It has always seemed to us there
was great justice and propriety in the English view of the subject, We think
any gentleman, whether professional or not, would feel delicacy and hesitation in
regard to becoming a witness to such a transaction. But with us the public
opinion, which is the sovereign arbiter of duty, presumes sometimes to override
the dogmas of written law. It is thus, no doubt, that it has come to be under-
stood here, by some at least, that the witnesses to a will are not to be regarded
as having expressed any opinion in regard to the sanity of the testator. It seems
to be supposed that they are only witnesses to the act of signing. But when it is
considered that the witnesses to a will must certify to the capacity of the testator,
as well as to the act of execution, the transaction begins to assume a somewhat
different aspect. One who puts his name as a witness to the execution of a will,
while he was conscious the testator was not in the possession of his mental facul
ties. places himself very much in the same attitude as if he had subscribed at
witness to a will which he knew to be a forgery, which every honorable man
could only regard as becoming accessory to the crime by which the will was
fabricated; so that it is not improbable that tie want of proper appreciation of
the discredit resulting from the act of becoming a witness to the execution of a
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the question of capacity, from age merely, 6hort of some extreme
period ; but, as is well said, "if a man in his old age becomes a
very child again in hs understanding, and is become so forgetful
will by one-confessedly incompetent to the proper understanding of the instrument,
may, and probably does, result chiefly, with us, from the general misapprehension
of tie law upon the subject, rather than from any settled disposition to disregard
its dictates if correctly understood. We are certainly gratified to be able to give
so charitable an explanation of what has always seemed to us a great, if not an
inexplicable, inconsistency or obtuseness in the public sentiment upon this subject
among the American people, in some sections of the country at least. We should
surely be glad to do all in our power to correct what we regard as a discredit to
the public sentiment, whether it be attributable to ignorance or to insensibility.
We mean, for a professional man, who is supposed to understand the subject
fully and to be in a position in life where he may act independently, to neverthe-
less consent to become a witness to a will executed by one wholly incapable of
comprehending its import.- The language of Lord CAMDEN, in his most able and
elaborate judgment in the celebrated case of Hindson vs. Kersey, 4 Burn's EccL
Law 85, 88, is of great significance upon this point: "And that the statute had a
main view to the quality of the witnesses will appear from this consideration,
namely: that a will is the only instrument in it (the Statute of Frauds) required
to be attested by subscribing- witnesses at the time of execution. It was efiough
for leases and all other conveyances to be in writing: these were all transactions
of health, and protected by valuable considerations and antecedent treaties. The
power of a court of equity was fully sufficient to meet with every fraud that could
be practised in these gases, after the contract was reduced lo writing. But a will
was a voluntary disposition,-executed suddenly in the last. sickness, oftentimes
almost in the article of death. And the only question that can be asked in this
case is, Was the testator in his senses when he made it? And consequently, the
time of execution is the critical minute that requires guard and protection. Here
you see the reason why witnesses are called in so emphatically. What fraud are
they to prevent? Even that fraud so commonly practised upon dying men, whose
llmfmt hnve survivPA t.Ph hpndq - whn h~v Atll %%1tm Pnth enugh in wte A narna
or make a mark, though the capacity of disposing is dead. What is the condition
of such an object, in the power of a few who are suffered to attend him, wheedled
or teased into submission for the sake of a little ease ? Put to the laborious task
of recollecting the full estate of all his affairs, and to weigh the Just merits and demerits
of those who belong to him, by remembering all and forgetting none. ..... Who then
shall secure the testator in this important moment from imposition? Who sball
protect the heir at law, and give the world a satisfactory, evidence that he was
sane? The statute says, three credible witnesses. What is their employment?
I say to inspect and judge of the testator's sanity before they attest. If he is not
capable, the witnesses ought to remonstrate and refuse their attestation. In all
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that he knows not his own name, he is then no more fit to make
his testament than a natural fool, or a child, or a lunatic."'
7. The American cases take a similar view of the effect of old
age upon testamentary capacity. One eighty-six years old, and
afflicted with disease, was held competent to execute a will.2  So
also one of eighty years of age, with energies greatly impaired.'
And in a case seriously contested,' where the testatrix was ninety
years old, it being shown that the deceased was of sound mind,
that the will was in conformity to one executed six years before,
when there was no question of her mental capacity, and also with
her repeatedly declared intentions, both before and after the date
of the last will; and that the provisions of the instrument were
reasonable, and were carefully read and explained to the testatrix
at the time she executed the will; and it appearing that no con-
cealment, deception, or influence had been used to procure the
will, it was established. The surrogate, in giving his opinion,
which was very minutely and carefully considered, thus con-
cludes:-
. 8. " Great age alone does not constitute testamentary disquali-
fication ; but, on the contrary, it calls for protection and aid to
further its wishes, when a mind capable of acting rationally, and
a memory sufficient in essentials, are shown to have existed, and
the last wilt is in consonance with definite'and long-settle. inten-
other cases the witnesses are passive, but here they are active, and in truth the
principal parties to the transaction; the testator is intrusted to their care. Sanity
is the great fact the witness is to speak to when he comes to prove the attestation,
and that is the true reason why a will can never be proved as an exhibit, viva voce,
in chancery, though a deed may; for there must be liberty to cross-examine to
the fact of sanity." "From the same consideration, it is become the invariable
practice of that court never to establish a will unless all the witnesses are exam.
ined, because the heir has a right to the proof of sanity from every one of them
whom the statute has placed about the testator."
I 1 Wms. Exrs. 36; G-ffiths vs. Roins, 8 Mad. 191; Hackenzie vs. Handajde,
2 Hagg. 211 ; Potts vs. House, 6 Ga. 824.
2 Waton vs. Watson, 2 B. Monr. 74.
3 Reed's Will, Id. 79.
'Maverick vs. Reynolds, 2 Bradf. Sur. Rep. 860.
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tions, is not ureasonable in its provisions and has been executed
with fairness."
9. And in another important case,1 the same learned judge
held that defect of memory, unless it be total or appertain to
things essential, is not sufficient to establish incapacity, and that
advanced age, of itself, raises no presumption against the capa-
city of the testator; and quotes, as the basis of his judgment,
the eloquent words of Chancellor KENT, in regard to the will of
a person between ninety and one hundred years of age.2
1 B eecker vs. Lynch, 1 Bradf. Sur. Rep. 458.
2 Van A181 vs. Hunter, 5 Johns. Ch. 148. The remarks of Judge BRADFORD, in
.Bleecher vs. Lkynch, supra, in regard to the effect of old age, are worthy of repeti-
tion here : "The effect of age upon the vigor of the mind varies so much accord-
ing to individual constitution, that it is difficult to form a sound general conclu-
sion on the mere fact of advanced age. In an intellectual sense, there is nothing
in the mind, abstractly speaking, tending to decay; its loss of tone and power is
consequent upon the ravages of time and disease upon the body, and especially
the brain, upon which the understanding is dependent for manifestation. It is
said that not more than seventy-eight in one thousand die of old age; and it is
scarcely possible to define the natural period of life, or its more frequent and
regular limit, independent of disease and accident. Blumenbach observes, that,
by an accurate examination of numerous bills of mortality, he had ascertained the
remarkable fact, ' that a pretty large proportion of Europeans reach their eighty-
fourth year." Haller gave a list of two hundred and twenty-one persons who
lived from one hundred to one hundred and sixty-nine years; 'Easton, a list of one
thousand seven hundred and twelve who attained a century and upwards. The
Condition of the mind, in these cases, of course varied. In Madden's six tables
of the ages of the most distinguished modern philosophers, jurists, artists, and
authors, and in D'Israeli's Notes on "the progress of old age in new studies,"
there are the names of many men whose genius shone in full splendor to the close
of an advanced life. I do not mean to gauge all cases by such remarkable in-
stances, but advert to them to show that each individual must be judged by him-
self. The power and brilliancy of the mind in old age is an exception, but so is
longevity itself. It may be observed, in this connection, that the system frequently
makes an effort at renovation in extreme old age, which is evinced in the cutting
of teeth, the recovery df the original color of the hair, and of perfect vision and
bearing. This is said to occur more frequently in females, and indicates tone and
strength in th nervous system, great vital power, and recuperative energy. A
fact of this kind occurred to the decedent, who, about the time the will was made,
recovered her vision, was able to read without spectacles, and to thread the finest
needle.
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10. " A man may freely make his testament, how old soever
he may be. . . . It is one of the painful consequences of extreme
old age that it ceases to excite interest, and is apt to be left
solitary and neglected. The control which the law still gives to
a man over the disposal of his property, is one of the most effi-
cient means which he has in protracted life to command the atten-
tion due to his infirmities. The will of such an aged man ought to
be regarded with great tenderness, when it appears not to have been
procured by fraudulent arts, but contains those very dispositions
which the circumstances of his situation and the course of the
natural affections dictated."'
11. One of the ablest and most experienced writers upon the
jurisprudence of insanity, Dr. Ray, has made some strictures
upon the mode of conducting jury trials, where questions affect-
ing mental capacity are to be determined, which we deem not
unworthy of being repeated here. They have particular refer-
ence to a cause tried in the state of Maine.' "No one," says
this writer, 4at all acquainted with the habits of old age, and
with the effect of 8enile dementia on the mind, can entertain a
doubt of the testator's competency to make his will. True, he
was more forgetful of the present than of the past; he fre-
quently forgot what he had just before said or done; and he
sometimes disregarded the common observances of life. All this,
however, may be said of multitudes of old men whose compe.
tency for any business is never questioned by those who know
them best. However weak may have been the mind of this old
man, he was still acquainted with the value of property, espe.
cially of his own; he recognised his relatives and friends, was
always aware of the exact nature of their relations toward him,
and of their respective claims on his bounty; he still was capable
of feeling the sting of filial ingratitude, and of being actuated by
motives of ordinary prudence and discretion. If his mind were
not sufficiently vigorous to engage in contracts and speculations
of large magnitude, it was none the less able to bequeath his pro.
I Ray, Med. Ju., 1 842, 843, 844.
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perty, the kind and amount of which he perfectly understood, to
relatives and friends whom he still recognised and loved. Tile will
was a rational act, rationally done, and there was not a tittle of
evidence to show that the testator was under improper influences.
12. "t The court, at each trial, refrained from any comments
on the evidence relating to the testator's mental condition, and
the jury were left to their own unenlightened and unassisted
deliberations. There were peculiar reasons, perhaps, for taking
this course in the present case, but we may be allowed to ques-
tion its propriety as a general rule of practice. In cases like
these, which are characterized by the abundance and discrepancy
of the evidence, it needs a cool, tenacious, and intelligent mind
to recapitulate this evidence; to sift, to analyze, weigh, and,
finally, stamp it with its proper value. The jury, it is true, are
sole judges of the facts, and if the question here were whether
certain facts offered in evidence were true or false, not a remark
might be required of the court. But since they have to do with
a very different question, that is, whether these facts warrant
certain inferences relative to mental capacity, they are unable to
answer it correctly, we apprehend, without the light that is derived
from superior penetration and attainments. The knowledge ne-
cessary for this purpose is of, a technical kind, which a jury can-
not be expected to possess, and the very abundance of the evidence
is calculated to fill their minds with uncertainty and confusion.
If they can hear the opinions of experts-of persons who have
given especial attention to this branch of knowledge-respecting
t e precise value of all these facts, considered in relation to the
point they are designed to establish, then, indeed, they would be
in a condition to form conclusions of their own. But since this is
not always practicable, are they to be left to float about on a sea
of conjecture, without star or compass to guide their course ?
Must a jury, not one of whom, perhaps, ever observed a case of
insanity, or even studied the operations of the sane mind, take
upon themselves to say that certain facts do or do not prove the
presence of testamentary capacity; in other words, to decide upon
professional questions of acknowledged difficulty ? The really
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intelligent and conscientious juror, distracted by an appalling
mass of evidence, much of which is irrelevant and contradictory,
which he may try in vain to unravel and arrange, and puzzled by
questions he never considered before, will and ought to look to
the court for assistance.
13. "The principle laid down by the court, at the first trial,
that a disposing mind means 'so much mind and memory as.
would enable him to transact common business with that intel-
ligence which belongs to the weakest class of sound minds,' may
be theoretically correct, but it seems to be of too abstract a
nature to be practically applied by jurors. To compare one mind
with another of different calibre is a task for which they are
altogether unfitted by their previous tastes, habits, and studies.
Justice merely requires that the strength of the mind should be
equal to the purpose to which it is applied. If this simple prin-
ciple be distinctly presented to the minds of the jury, there are
few so dull as to be unable to give it a practical application. It is
not only reasonable, but it has the merit of having been repeatedly
recognised in courts of law, until it has now obtained all the force
Df established authority. ' He may not have sufficient strength
of memory and vigor of intellect to make and to digest all the
parts of a contract, and yet be competent to direct the distribu-
tion of his property by will.'1 'A man may be capable of making
a will, and yet incapable of making a contract, or to manage his
estate.' "
14. We do not suppose medical experts would be able to in-
struct jurors in the law of insanity, much more understandingly
than it is commonly done by courts. The great uncertainty in
the result of such trials depends more upon the contradictory
1 Stevens vs. Vancleve, 4 Wash. C. C. 262.
'Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. C. C. 580. In regard to these commentaries, con-
tained in the charges of Mr. Justice WASHINGTON, upon the subject of testamentary
capacity, this learned writer says: "Nowhere has the subject of testamentary
capacity been treated with so much good sense and regard to scientific truth as in
the charges of the court from which the above quotations are made. With the
progress of sound views on this subject, the correctness of the principles there
laid down will only be the more firmly established."
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nature of the evidence than this learned writer is probably aware
of. And it is impossible often for any one to say, with much
certainty, upon which side the testimony is really entitled to the
most credit. And unfortunately for the regrets here expressed
in regard to the absence of medical experts who could place all
doubts and uncertainties upon this perplexing subject in such a
light as to remove all difficulty, experience has shown, both here
and in England, that they differ quite as widely in their infer-
ences and opinions as do the other witnesses. That has become
so uniform a result with medical experts of late, that they are
beginning to be regarded much in the light of hired advocates,
and their testimony as nothing more than a studied argument in
favor of the side for which they have been called. So uniformly
has this proved true, in our limited experience, that it would
excite scarcely less surprise to find an expert, called by one side,.
testifying in any particular in favor of the other side, than to find
the counsel upon either side arguing against their clients,' and in
favor of their antagonists.
1 We do not intend by this to cast the slightest reflection upon the integrity of
medical or other experts. There is little doubt they are as upright and indepen-
dent as any other class of men. But they are mortal, and being so, they are liable
to see all subjects thfough the refracting lens of interest and partiality. They
are applied to and employed the same as the counsel, and paid, or should be, for
their time in examining the case, at professional prices, and all with a view to
find good reason for bringing the cause to the result desired by those who employ
them. It is not wonderful, therefore, that upon subjects of so much uncdrtainty,
they should fall into the line of opinion most favorable to that side whose case has
been so often urged upon their favorable consideration. In addition to this, there will
always be such marked conflict in the testimony as to facts, that it is commonly
next to impossible to know which is right, and the expert is always expected, of
course, to assume the theory of the facts maintained by the side calling him. This,
of itself, is enough to throw the experts world-wide apart in the results of their
opinions and speculations. We recollect a case tried before us, not many years
back, which is of no great interest, except as illustratiug the point to which we
have just been alluding. The case was one where the son had subscribed his.
father's name, as surety, to his own note, as he claimed, by his father's consent.
It was claimed in defence, that the father had been, for years before the date of
the note, a mere imbecile, and wholly incapable of comprehending any such trans-
action, as he confessedly was for some years before his death. The testimony
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15. It seems to be the result of all the cases, English and
American, that intellectual feebleness alone will not disqualify
one for making a will.' But there is a large class of cases where
the testaments of aged people come in controversy, in which the
element of undue influence, imposition, and fraud is mixed up with
the weakness and imbecility of mind of the testator. In such
cases, courts and juries should be reasonably watchful to see that
no improper influence has been exercised, in the production of an
unjust or unequal distribution of the testator's property. In
other words, that if the will was executed at a time when the
testator was in a condition of mind susceptible of being easily
was very voluminous, and strangely conflicting. It was proved, on the part of the
plaintiff, that the old man understood that his name was to be subscribed to the
note, and also that it had been done; that he repeatedly cautioned his son not to
let his father be injured by it ; and that he told the creditor he was secure, since
he had his name, and that he was, at the time of the execution of the note,
abundantly capable of comprehending this and other similar business transac-
tions.
On the other hand, it was proved by multitudes of the most unimpeachable
witnesses, that for a long time before the date of this note, the old man was in the
daily habit of doing and saying things which it was not easy to reconcile with
any such remaining mental capacity as was requisite to make a binding contract.
As, that he could not feed himself, did not recognise his own children whom he
met daily, would turn his tea into his plate at table, would get lost in his own
house, sit down on the floor, follow his wife from room to room, holding on to her
dress like an infant child, exhibiting the most boisterous grief upon the slightest
occasion, or none at all, and not unfrequently attempting to build a fire in the
middle of the room, with some other things too disgusting to be named, but strikingly
indicative of imbecility. We submitted the case to the jury upon the mere ques-
tion of fact, whether the deceased had capacity at the time to understand the
nature of the transaction, and consented to have his name attached to the note,
and a verdict was given for the plaintiff. It was a mere question of fact upon the
credibility of the testimony upon the different sides, and no rule of medical law
could aid the jury. It was impossible to believe the testimonyon both sides. The
inquiry was, which is the most probable? The testimony made a case free from
all question for both sides. Our own experience convinces us that this is a not
uncommon result.
I lliot's Will, 2 J. J. Marshall 340; Dornick vs. Rcichenback, 10 S..& R. 84;
Blanchard vs. festle, 8 Denio 37. It is here said, there must be a total want of
understanding to render one intestable, and that the expression "of unsound
mind" in the New York statute means the same as non compos ients.
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controlled, and the will itself is one giving unequal advantages
towards parties in a position to have brought their influences to
bear upon the testator, the triers of its validity have a right to
require those thus exposed to suspicion,'to prove, with reasonable
certainty, that the will was the offspring of the free agency of the
testator. Hence it is very properly said, that where a will is just
and equal, and displays reason, memory, and benevolence [and we
should add justice], and the same was made without advice or
dictation, it may be regarded as satisfactory evidence that it was
the prodtuct of a disposing mind.'
16. We shall here give a short but pertinent extract from the
able work of Dr. Taylor ;2 ,I am indebted to a learned judge for
the following note: Another case may be noticed which often
occurs in the- experience of lawyers, and to which, in attendance
on aged persons, medical gentlemen do not sufficiently attend. A
person's mind in extreme old age may be quite intelligent, his
understanding of business clear, and his competency to converse
upon and transact such, undoubted,, and his bodily strength good ;
but there may grow upon him such a fear and dread of relatives
who may have surrounded him, and on whom he may have become
perfectly dependent, that his nervous system is wholly overcome,
and he becomes a- mere child and tool in the hands of those about
him, so that he has no-power to exert his mind in opposition to
their wishes or to resist their importunities. His mind is enslaved
by his fears and feeling of helplessness, so that to that extent'
and in matters in which he may be moved by them, he really is
f~ciIe and imbecile. This state of things seems, in great old age,
1 McDanils Will, 2 J. J. Marshall 831. Our own experiences, after having
had knowledge of a considerable number of this class of cases, would induce the
conclusion that juries are generally inclined to sustain the wills of very aged and
very infirm persons: and often, of those in extreme sickness, almost in articula
morri, where the deed itself is rational and just. But that where this is not the
fact, juries are very willing to be convinced of some good reason to set the will
aside, and more commonly succeed in finding some excuse satisfactory to them
selves for doing so; and we have never felt that this tendency among juries was
either unnatural or unjust.
2 Med. Jur. 659.
